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Abstract
Today a considerable volume of federal caseload is under the jurisdiction of
specialized courts at both the district level and circuit level. Ironically, neither judicial
scholars nor political scientists treat this topic as a priority in their research agenda.
Therefore, what the exact impact of specialized courts on the federal judicial system
has not been carefully explored. The current study makes a primary effort to
empirically figure out the systematic impact of specialized trial courts on the U.S.
federal judicial system. By focusing on the simplest situation in history where both
generalist trial courts and specialized trial courts were only under the direct
supervision of generalist circuits, I find that specialized trial courts did enjoy a
significant and considerable advantage in avoiding case reversal over their generalist
counterparts.
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1. Instruction
The creation and development of federal specialized courts1 in the United States
have been intimately related with the expansion of bureaucracy regulating the modern
American life. In order to effectively deal with the complexity of a modern society,
Congress delegated constitutional powers to bureaucratic agencies such as
departmental divisions and independent commissions. Such a relationship of
delegation however can raise serious problems of bureaucratic accountability, which
has received considerable attention (most of which is criticism) from media, the
public, political observers and politicians. Students of American politics typically
describe this relationship as “between a principal, one who has permitted or directed
another to act for his benefit and subject to his direction or control and an agent, one
who acts on behalf of the principal” (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994, 674).
Through

this

principal-agent

perspective,

political

scientists

attribute

the

accountability issue to the existence of asymmetric information between the
legislature (the principal) and the bureaucracy (the agent), which directly raises
classical dilemmas such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Also by following this
strand of thought, institutional designers raise insightful suggestions concerning a
successful containment of bureaucratic discretion, among which judicial review has
become more and more significant (Lowi, Ginsberg, and Shepsle 2004). To better
utilize the mechanism of judicial review to monitor and influence bureaucratic
behaviors, Congress established several federal specialized courts with limited
1

I use Unah's (1998, 7) definition of specialized courts, as “courts that possess limited subject matter jurisdiction
and are staffed by permanent judges who have substantive expertise in the area” in this study.
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jurisdiction defined by certain policy areas such as bankruptcy, tax, international trade,
and patent. And propositions concerning the further establishment of more specialized
courts2 side by side with the traditional generalist courts within the federal judicial
system have also been under debate and scrutiny.
Despite their growing influence and promising potential in shaping and tailoring
public policies, specialized courts nevertheless have long been overlooked by both
mainstream judicial scholars and political scientists. And the extremely limited
existing literature has been exclusively focusing on the unusual judicial behavior of
federal specialized courts in comparison with the federal generalist courts (Baum
1977, Jordan 1981, Hansen, Johnson, and Unah 1995, Unah 1997, 1998, Wald 1982).
In the current research, I am intending to transcend this limit by looking at
quantitative evidence concerning the influence of specialized courts on the federal
judicial system.3 In particular, I am interested in the systematic impact of specialized
courts on the decisions made by federal circuits in reviewing petitions arising from
lower trial courts. Therefore the primary empirical question I am trying to answer is:
Will the institutional uniqueness of specialized courts noticed by both political
scientists and jurists give such courts observable advantages in avoiding the decision
of reversal made by the federal circuits?
A review of the theoretical literature on specialized courts seems to drive us to
two opposing conclusions. On the one hand, judicial scholars seem to hold that when
facing the review of petition held by higher generalist courts, the highly limited
2

Most significant examples include the proposed establishments of a court of environment and a court of labor.
To my knowledge, there has been no quantitative study in this direction despite the existence of sporadic case
studies taken by scholars of judicial politics and jurists.
3
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jurisdiction of federal specialized courts makes them suffer a considerable
disadvantage that is usually accompanied with a higher frequency of reversal in
comparison to generalist trial courts. On the other hand, political scientists equipped
with strategic thought seem to believe that the limited jurisdiction defined by certain
policy areas can be attributed to the rise of asymmetric information between federal
specialized courts and federal generalist courts. And the asymmetric information
endows a considerable advantage to the federal specialized courts in the process of
petition review, which could finally be transferred into a lower rate of reversal. By
focusing on the period of 1925-1982, where both the generalist courts and specialized
courts at the trial level are under the direct supervision of generalist federal circuits, I
find array of empirical evidence consistent with the answer provided by political
scientists trained with strategic thought. However since the current study is only a
crude approximation of the real world, more efforts in theoretical modeling as well as
empirical analysis are needed before we can draw a definitive conclusion on this issue.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section two, I start with
analyzing theories that support either the advantage argument or the disadvantage
argument and deriving testable hypotheses accordingly. In section three, I discuss my
data source, statistical methods and variable operationalizations. Empirical results are
presented and discussed in section four. In the concluding remarks, section five, I
summarize my findings and propose directions for future studies.
2. Federal Specialized Courts and Their Effect on the Federal Circuits' Decision
Making
(a) A General Review of the Federal Judicial System: Generalist Courts v.s.
Specialized Courts
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The federal judicial system of the U.S. is a three-layer, pyramid-like hierarchical
structure with the Supreme Court sitting on the top. For the most part of the 20th
century, the Supreme Court oversaw twelve federal appeal courts at the circuit
level---eleven regional circuits plus the District of Columbia circuit. Under these
federal circuits, there are a total of ninety-four federal district courts. All of these
courts mentioned above---the Supreme Court, the federal circuits, and the federal
district courts are generalist courts whose practice of jurisdiction are basically not
delimited within a specific policy area. Over the century, Congress established several
specialized courts that only have judicial power over certain policy areas. And for the
most part of their history, specialized courts enjoy a similar judicial position to those
district courts within the federal system---they are trial courts and are under the
supervision of higher appeal courts. This situation however changed in 1982, when
Congress decided to establish a specialized appeal court at the circuit level---the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.4
Keeping this structure in mind, my current study intends to investigate the
systematic impact of the federal specialized courts on the federal judicial system.
Specifically, I am interested in answering whether the uniqueness of specialized
courts in their institutional design makes any difference in comparison with their
generalist counterparts when facing the review of higher courts? And if yes, what is
the direction of the difference? In other words, does the institutional uniqueness of

4

The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was established under Article III of the Constitution
on October 1, 1982. The court was formed by the merger of the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals and the appellate division of the United States Court of Claims, two previous specialized courts at the
district level.
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specialized courts help them win more deference from higher courts in the form of a
lower rate of reversal, or on the contrary, create a less desirable situation in which a
higher rate of reversal is observed? Ideally, such an examination should include both
generalist courts and specialized courts at the higher levels---the federal circuits, the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. However, given the
lack of data on the decisions made by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and
the intractable nature of a three-level analysis, an inclusion of the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court in the current study seems unrealistic.
Therefore, I limit my ambition by constraining the research domain to the simplest
situation where the trial courts, both generalists and specialized, are only overseen by
generalist appeal courts at the circuit level---the eleven federal circuits and the District
of Columbia circuit. However, such a limited research domain is still valuable for at
least two reasons. First, it appropriately fits the most part of 20th century history.
Since the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit only existed after 1982, most of the
historical records should be reasonably explained under the current research setting.
Second, our knowledge accumulated with the current research domain might provide
strong shoulders on which future researchers5 may stand.
(b)Specialized Courts and Federal Circuits' Decision of Reversal: Convergence or
Divergence
Both political scientists and jurists emphasize the institutional uniqueness of
federal specialized courts in comparison to federal generalist courts. Most
5

Who may intend to make either a vertical (by including the Supreme Court) or a horizontal (by including the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) expansion of the current study.
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significantly, the federal specialized courts distinguish themselves from their
generalist counterparts in their concentration of jurisdiction. For instance, the Court of
International Trade exclusively deals with cases involving U.S foreign trade policies.
Similarly, the U.S. Patent Court only has the judicial power over civil cases
concerning intellectual property. Since their practice of jurisdiction is narrowly
defined within certain policy areas, the federal specialized courts are inevitably
immersed with a flood of technically homogeneous cases containing similar
underlying facts, administrative regulations, and legal norms. And the direct effect of
such a continuous exposure to the homogenous pool of cases is specialized court
judges' acquirement of knowledge over the policy area under their supervision. This is
indeed a process of learning through repeated stimuli. And such array of stimuli could
be so decisive that the expertise acquired by specialized court judges quickly amounts
to the level that is comparable to or even higher than that reached by professional
bureaucrats in the related area. In contrast to the federal specialized courts, the federal
generalist courts exercise judicial power that is not delimited by any single policy area.
Therefore, the possession of expertise about specialized fields of bureaucratic
administration seems foreign to the judges sitting on federal generalist courts.
Despite their general agreement on the institutional uniqueness of specialized
courts with respect to policy-defined jurisdiction, judicial scholars and political
scientists have quite different understandings of its implications on the federal judicial
system. Indeed, their reasoning lines could be so different that they finally end up
with opposed conclusions for how federal circuits will behave in response to the
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petitions arising from different trial courts. On the one hand, judicial scholars are
more inclined to a divergence argument suggesting that the institutional uniqueness of
specialized courts introduces considerably more inconsistencies in the federal judicial
system and hence would receive more reversals from generalist appeal courts. On the
other hand, political scientists are more likely to support a convergence argument
proposing that the expertise possessed by judges of specialized trial courts nourishes
an asymmetrical distribution of information between federal specialized courts and
federal generalist courts, which would finally help federal specialized courts win more
deference from higher generalist courts than their generalist counterparts. Here I try to
trace out the typical lines of reasoning taken by the two sides and derive testable
hypotheses accordingly.
Judicial scholars argue that the institutional uniqueness inherited in specialized
courts drive them toward decisions that in the eyes of generalist courts are
inconsistent with the founding principles of the U.S. federal judiciary (Shapiro 1968,
1981, Meador 1981, Posner 1983). Since for the most part of the 20th century, appeal
courts are exclusively generalists, specialized trial courts are relatively disadvantaged
when facing the review of higher appeal courts than their generalist counterparts. The
reasons for why the institutional uniqueness of specialized courts raises
inconsistencies within the generalist-dominated federal judicial system could be
summarized in the following three facets. First and foremost, many judicial scholars
believe that because of their expertise, judges serving in specialized courts have a
narrow or even ill-defined view of law and policy. For instance, the possession of
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field-specific knowledge concerning a single policy area may considerably influence
the specialized courts' ability to appreciate ideas and insights drawn for other issue
areas or other fields of law. However, the traditional legal philosophy held broadly
and strongly by generalist courts is that judicial decisions should be devoid of
field-driven pre-assumptions and rather should be based on a grander concern of
judiciary and meaning of law. In addition, judicial decisions driven by field-specific
knowledge may make certain fields of law the prisoners of policy specialists and
legislators. For many common-law jurists, such a result obviously commits the
original sin of legislative supremacy that is prevailing in civil-law tradition and hence
is contradictory to the ideal of judicial independence that is deeply rooted in and
cherished by the American common-law tradition (David and Brierley 1968, Ehrmann
1976, Merryman 1985).
Secondly, the tradition of common-law systems downplays the importance of
courts whose exercise of jurisdiction is limited within a single policy area. And judges
sitting on generalist “normal” courts and the general public alike often question the
quality of judges serving in such specialized courts and hence the decisions made by
them. Again this belief could be traced back to a common-law tradition which
interprets the practice of truncated jurisdiction in specialized courts that was firstly
and widely adopted in civil-law societies as the legal exigency to save their notorious
ideology of legislative supremacy that is obviously contradictory to common-law
understanding of judicial independence and the balance of power (David and Brierley
1968, Merryman 1985). Keeping the above two points in mind, we can easily
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understand why Shapiro (Shapiro 1968, 52-53) argues: “The particular virtue of the
judge is ignorance...to the extent that judges specialized, they lose the one quality that
clearly disguises them from administrative lawmakers. Once they lose that quality
there seems to be relatively little reason to have two separate specialists, one labeled
judge and the other bureaucrat, making policy in the same field.”
Finally, the concentration of jurisdiction and hence case homogeneity within
federal specialized courts are claimed to make specialized court the prey of related
interest groups. Supposedly by either ensuring the appointment of their favorite
judges or capturing judges through their repeated engagements with the court, well
organized and mobilized interest groups in the related field might influence court
decisions toward the direction favoring their own interest in stead of social justice. In
that case, the decision made by specialized courts would be systematically biased in
favor of field-related interest groups and hence jeopardize legal justice. Such a
problem of clientlism, however, is rarely a problem in a generalist court since it hears
cases affecting many groups with considerably different interests and the influence of
one group could be easily attenuated by the influence introduced by another.
Many readers may question the above common-law jurists' opinions as
misunderstandings or even prejudices toward the civil-law tradition and hence
specialized courts. It is worth noting, however, that such opinions do have important
implications from a social science perspective on the potential different responses of
federal generalist circuits to their specialized and generalist subordinates, the key
interest of the current study. As the former Supreme Court Justice Holmes reminds us
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(Holmes 1881), “The life of law has not been logic... The felt necessities of the time,
the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or
unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men have had a
good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men
should be governed.” Given all these, we have the following hypothesis of
divergence.
Hypothesis 1 (Divergence): In reviewing petitions arising from lower trial courts, the
generalist appeal courts are more likely to reverse decisions made by specialized trial
courts than those by generalist trial courts.
In sharp contrast to the “sincerity” assumption held by most judicial scholars,
students of political science usually assume that political actors behave strategically
and emphasize that political actors' expertise plays a pivotal role in such strategic
behaviors. More recently, political scientists extended the idea of the informational
effect of expertise to the study of strategic behaviors within the federal judicial system
(Baum 1994, Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994). And a closer examination of this
discourse shows that it fits perfectly with the current study. Specialized court judges
acquire expertise through their intensive engagement with cases arising from a single
policy area, which usually become comparable to that possessed by bureaucratic
professionals. Given the technical complexity of modern bureaucratic administration
and the fact of limited judicial resources for any single court, specialized courts are
much better informed than their generalist supervisors and counterparts for their
specialized areas of jurisdiction. Therefore, if we observe the relationship between
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trial courts and appeal courts through the scope of principal-agent theory, we can
easily see that the possession of expertise over certain policy areas endows specialized
trial courts (one type of agent) with an advantage over generalist trial courts (the other
type of agent) when facing the review of the generalist appeal courts (the principal).
As a result, generalist appeal courts are more likely to discover the flaws of decision
committed by generalist trial courts than those committed by specialized trial courts.
If the above reasoning is correct, we have reached the following hypothesis of
convergence.
Hypothesis 2 (Convergence): In reviewing petitions arising from lower trial courts,
the generalist appeal courts are more likely to defer to decisions made by specialized
trial courts than those by generalist trial courts.
3. Data, Methods, and Variable Operationalizations
In order to study the systematic impact of specialized trial courts on the federal
judicial system, I use the data set of United States Courts of Appeals Database Phrase
1, 1925-1988 (ICPSR No.2086), which was originally collected by Donald Songer.
The data set is constituted by a random sample of all the petitions judged by the
twelve federal circuits during the period from 1925 through 1988. Because no record
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuits---the only specialized one at the
circuit level---is included in this data set, I constrain the temporal scope of this
research within the period from 1925 through 1981. The data analysis then proceeds
according to the type of case. Because specialized trial courts primarily exist in the
policy areas of economic administration, I first study cases whose basic concern is an
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economic issue. To test the robustness of my findings, I further study an enlarged
sample space that contains both economic cases and other non-criminal cases.
The dependent variable of this study is the decision of federal circuits to the
petitions arising from both generalist trial courts and specialized trial courts. I code
this variable in two ways---binary and ordinal. In the binary coding, the value of 0 is
given if the decision made by a trial court is unconditionally upheld by a circuit court
or the circuit court denied or dismissed the petition.6 The value of 1 is given if the
decision made by a trial court is either partially reversed or fully reversed. In order to
check the robustness of my findings in accordance with binary coding, I introduce an
ordinal coding in which I further differentiate a partial reversal from a full reversal
and give the value of 1 to the former and the value of 2 to the later. To meet the
individuality of each measurement, I run ordinary logistic regression for the binary
measure of reversal and ordinal logistic regression for the ordinary measure of
reversal.
The primary explanatory variable of the current study is the source of
petition---whether the case was raised from a generalist trial court or a specialized
trial court. I treat this variable as a dummy---if the case was appealed through a
generalist trial court to a federal circuit, it is coded as 0; if it was appealed through a
specialized trial court to a federal circuit, it is coded as 17. The control variables of
this study include whether an issue about (1) jurisdiction (2)failure to state a claim

6

In the former case, the appeal court actively assures the validity of the decision made by a trial court while in the
later case, it chooses to support the decision of a trial court by passively denying any further action.
7
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, U.S. Court of Claims, U.S. Military Appeals,
and U.S. Tax Court.
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(3)standing

(4)mootness

(5)governmental

immunity

(6)

timeliness

or

(7)

frivolousness.
4. Empirical Results
Empirical results based on treating appeal court decisions as a binary outcome are
presented in Table 1. It shows that when reviewing an appeal primarily concerning
economic issues, a switch from a generalist trial court to a specialized trial court in the
source of petition significantly decreases the chance of reversal drawn up by a federal
circuit. Obviously, this evidence supports the convergence argument commonly held
by political scientists. For all control variables, only the dispute of jurisdiction has a
significant effect on the likelihood of case reversal. By expanding my research sample
from economic cases to all non-criminal cases, I do a cross-validation test to show the
robustness of my findings. As shown in the right-hand-most column of Table 1, the
above findings are confirmed---coefficients keep their directions with the same level
of statistical significance and their magnitude only changes slightly.
[Table.1 here]
Due to the nonlinear nature of logistic regression, coefficients show in Table 1
can not be interpreted directly. Hence, to show the quantities of my research interest, I
calculate the predicted probabilities in some hypothetical contexts (See Table 3). First,
I use economic cases as my research sample and set all control variables concerning
threshold issues---jurisdiction, failure to claim, standing, mootness, governmental
immunity, timeliness, and frivolousness at the value of 0. In other words, this is a
situation where none of these threshold issues are involved in an appealing process.
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Under this setting, a switch from a generalist trial court to a specialized trial court is
expected to decrease the likelihood of reversal by 5.9 percent (the confidence interval
is between 2.4 percent and 9.3 percent). Second, I construct another hypothetical
situation in which all of the threshold issues are supposedly involved in an appealing
process. In this case, a switch in appeal source from a generalist trial court to a
specialized trial court decreases the likelihood of reversal by 3.8 percent (the
confidence interval is between 0.2 percent and 7.4 percent). Further examinations
based on an expanded research sample including all non-criminal cases demonstrate a
similar effect. A switch in the source of appeal from a generalist trial court to a
specialized court on average decreases the probability of case reversal by 6.4 percent
(with a confidence interval between 3 percent and 10 percent) in the situation where
none of the threshold issues are involved. And when all such issues are involved, the
same switch is expected to decrease the probability of case reversal by 4.7 percent
(with a confidence interval between 1.2 percent and 8.3 percent).
[Table.2 here]
Empirical findings based on the ordinal measure of case reversal are reported in
Table 2. It shows that a change from a generalist trial court to a specialized trial court
in the source of petition does contribute a negative effect on the likelihood of both
partial reversal and full reversal. And such an effect is robust to the expansion of
research sample from pure economic cases to all non-criminal cases. According to the
estimates about economic cases, the threshold (cut1) of separating affirmation and
partial reversal is 0.547 (with a confidence interval between 0.492 and 0.603) while
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the threshold (cut2) of separating partial reversal and full reversal is 0.813 (with a
confidence interval between 0.756 and 0.870). The fact that the estimated cut1 is
smaller than and disentangled with the estimated cut2 gives an important piece of
information that the dependent variable is indeed ordinal massed. And this statement
is equally valid for the expanded sample including all non-criminal cases appealed to
the federal circuits in which the estimated cut1 is 0.518 (with a confidence interval
between 0.469 and 0.567) and the estimated cuit2 is 0.798 (with a confidence interval
between 0.747 and 0.849). Again, cut1 is smaller than cut2 and they are not
overlapped.
As before, I interpret the meaning of original statistical estimates within several
hypothetical contexts. In the situation where no threshold issues are involved in the
petition of an economic case, a switch in appeal source from a generalist trial court to
a specialized one accounts for a 0.5 percent (with confidence interval between 0.2 and
0.9 percent) decrease in the likelihood of partial reversal and a 5 percent (with a
confidence interval between 2 percent and 8 percent) decrease in the likelihood of full
reversal. In the situation where all threshold issues are involved in the petition of an
economic case, the same change in the source of appeal on average explains a 0.6
percent (with confidence interval between 0.1 and 1 percent) decrease in the
probability of partial reversal and a 3 percent (with a confidence interval between 0.1
percent and 6 percent) decrease in the probability of full reversal. For all non-criminal
cases appealed to the federal circuits, when none of the threshold issues are involved,
a switch in the source of appeal accounts for a 0.6 percent (with a confidence interval
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between 0.2 and 1 percent) decrease in the likelihood of partial reversal and a 6
percent (with a confidence interval between 3 percent and 9 percent) decrease in the
likelihood of full reversal. When all of the threshold issues are involved, the same
switch in the source of appeal explains a 0.7 percent (with a confidence interval
between 0.3 and 1 percent) decrease in the probability of partial reversal and a 4
percent (with a confidence interval between 1 percent and 7 percent) decrease in the
probability of full reversal.
[Table.3 here]
The above econometric findings show significant and considerable effects of
specialized trial courts on the decision of reversal drawn by the federal circuits. And
the convergence argument is obviously supported. Besides the pure statistical methods
in use, there is also a theoretical way by which I can confirm the validity of my
findings. Suppose both parties in disputes know in advance that the generalist appeal
court reverse decisions according to the source of appeal due to the intensified
asymmetric information between specialized trial courts and their generalist
supervisors. Then the party who is unsatisfied with the decision made by the two
types of trial courts (generalist trial courts and specialized trial courts) would behave
quite differently. The potential petitioners through a specialized court will only appeal
those cases that are highly likely to be reversed by higher courts. In other words, they
are imposing a more stringent standard on their selection for appealing cases. Hence,
there should exist a systematic difference between cases appealed through generalist
trial courts and specialized trial courts. And as we all know, estimates without a
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decent control of selection effect can lead to biased results.
My current study does not make any effort to control such a case selection effect.
Therefore, it is possible that all the statistical findings reported above are under the
threat of bias. However, bias is not necessarily a bad thing for the conclusion I am
trying to make as long as I know the direction of such a bias. And this is the case in
my current study. Since cases appealed through specialized courts are those that are
highly likely to be overturned by generalist appeal courts, my statistical findings must
on some level underestimate the real impact of specialized trial courts on the
decisions made by the federal circuits. In other words, the potential bias makes me
more confident about the statement that specialized courts as a source of appeal
significantly decrease the likelihood of case reversal by federal circuits, since the
significance and magnitude reported above are probably very conservative estimates
of their actual effects.8
5. Concluding Remarks
As Felix Frankfurter and James Landis noticed (Frankfurter and Landis 1928,
147), “an important phase in the history of the federal judiciary deals with the
movement for the establishment of the tribunals whose business was to be limited to
litigation arising from a restricted field of legislative control.” Today a considerable
volume of federal caseload has already been under the jurisdiction of specialized
courts at both the trial level and circuit level. Ironically, neither judicial scholars nor

8

The establishment of Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuits by Congress in 1982 may serve as an ad hoc
evidence for the statement that specialized courts are more successful in avoiding reversal of federal circuits.
Probably because Congress realized the disadvantage of using generalist appeal courts to oversee specialized trial
courts, a specialized appeal court at the circuit level was finally established.
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political scientists treat this topic as a priority in their research agenda. Therefore,
what the exact impact of specialized courts on the federal judicial system has yet to
receive the attention it really deserves. The current study makes a primary effort to
figure out the systematic impact of specialized courts on the U.S. federal judicial
system. By focusing on the simplest situation in history where both generalist trial
courts and specialized trial courts were only under the direct supervision of generalist
circuits, I find that specialized trial courts did enjoy a significant and considerable
advantage in avoiding case reversal over their generalist counterparts. And such
evidence obviously supports the convergence argument usually held by political
scientists.
It is worth noting, however, that the current research is a rather crude
approximation of what happens in the real world. Therefore, further theoretical as
well as empirical efforts are needed for a more complete and conclusive answer to the
proposed impact of specialized trial courts on the federal judicial system. Here I
suggest two directions for future related efforts. First, we can theoretically complicate
the current situation by introducing the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit into
our study and investigating what impact the specialized trial courts can make on the
federal judicial system when they are overseen by both generalist and specialized
higher courts. Since this setting of two types of appeal courts overseeing two types of
trial courts is a much more accurate description of the post-1982 federal judicial
system, findings based on this setting might provide more useful insights for a better
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understanding of the contemporary American judiciary. 9 The second possible
direction for future research is to investigate the impact of specialized trial courts on
the decision making of individual judges of the higher courts rather than their effect
on individual cases. By substituting case with judge as our unit of analysis, we can
better communicate with wisdom accumulated by mainstream empirical works
concerning U.S. judicial politics. For example, we may try to control both the attitude
of judges 10 and other political branches such as Congress and the presidency.
Obviously such studies at a more “micro” level make the study of specialized courts’
impact more complete.

Table1. Ordinary Logistic Regression Results for the Binary Measure of the
Federal Circuits Review Decision 1925-1981
Sample
Variables
Source of appeal
Jurisdiction
Failure to claim
Standing
Mootness
Gov. immunity

Economic cases
(Standard error)
-0.263***
(0.082)
0.177***
(0.041)
0.067
(0.066)
-0.015
(0.087)
0.063
(0.102)
-0.152
(0.208)

All non-criminal cases
(Standard error)
-0.285***
(0.081)
0.150***
(0.035)
0.056
(0.52)
0.051
(0.073)
0.121
(0.080)
0.127
(0.093)

9

Besides the complexity of modeling, the major difficulty for taking this direction is the lack of data collection
about the decisions made by the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
10
However, compared with the attitude of Supreme Court justices, the measurement of judges' attitude at the
circuit level could be theoretically more controversial and practically more laborious.
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Timeliness

-0.127
(0.173)

-0.293
(0.163)

Frivolousness

-0.876
(0.536)

-0.864
(0.444)

Constant

-0.555***
(0.028)

-0.524***
(0.025)

Number of observation
Note: *0.05 level

6581
**0.01 level

8134
***0.005 level

Table2. Ordinal Logistic Regression Results for the Ordinal Measure of the
Federal Circuits Review Decision 1925-1981
Sample
Variables
Source of appeal

Economic cases
(Standard error)
-0.253***
(0.082)
0.144***
(0.036)
-0.002
(0.056)
-0.012
(0.086)
0.043
(0.093)
-0.233
(0.201)

All non-criminal cases
(Standard error)
-0.275***
(0.080)
0.122***
(0.032)
0.001
(0.045)
0.054
(0.072)
0.098
(0.073)
0.073
(0.082)

Timeliness

-0.101
(0.173)

-0.269
(0.164)

Frivolousness

-0.865
(0.536)

-0.849
(0.442)

Cut1
Cut2
Number of observation

0.547
0.813
6581

0.518
0.798
8134

Note: *0.05 level

**0.01 level

***0.005 level

Jurisdiction
Failure to claim
Standing
Mootness
Gov. immunity
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Table3. Interpretation in Hypothetic Settings for the Switch from Generalist
Trial Courts to Specialized trial Courts in the Source of Appeal
Probability Changes

No threshold issues involved

All threshold issues involved

Economic

Non-criminal

Economic

Non-criminal

Chance of reversal

-5.9

-6.4

-3.8

-4.7

(Confidence interval)

(-2.4,-9.3)

(-3,-10)

(-0.2,-7.4)

(-1.2,-8.3)

Partial reversal

-0.5

-0.6

-0.6

-0.7

(Confidence interval)

(-0.2,-0.9)

(-0.2,-1)

(-0.1,1)

(-0.3,-1)

Full reversal

-5

-6

-3

-4

(Confidence interval)

(-2,-8)

(-3,-9)

(-0.1,-6)

(-1,-7)

Binary measure:

Ordinal measure:
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